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Editorial

Machine learning with personal data: is data
protection law smart enough to meet the
challenge?
Christopher Kuner*, Dan Jerker B. Svantesson**, Fred H. Cate***,
Orla Lynskey***, and Christopher Millard***
Almost seven decades after Alan Turing conceived of ‘intelligent machines’, there has recently been a surge of interest
in machine learning and algorithmic decision-making. The
popular imagination has been stirred by high-profile events
such as the victory of IBM’s supercomputer, Watson, in
the US quiz show Jeopardy, and Google Deepmind’s deep
learning program AlphaGo’s victory in the ancient Chinese
game Go. Meanwhile, machine learning processes are being deployed in contexts as varied as fraud prevention,
medical diagnostics, and the development of autonomous
vehicles. The underlying technologies are increasingly accessible to data controllers, with major cloud computing
providers including Amazon, IBM, Google, and Microsoft
offering low-cost, scalable, cloud-supported machine learning services and tools, with a particular focus on data mining and other types of predictive analytics.
Regulation of ‘automated individual decisions’ is not
new to data protection law and was addressed explicitly
in the 1995 Data Protection Directive (DPD).1 The 2016
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) extends
the protection against decisions made solely on the basis
of automated processing to cover not only profiling of
data subjects but also any other form of automated processing.2 All of the data protection principles apply to
such processing, but perhaps most significant are the requirements of the first principle, which stipulates that
processing of personal data must be lawful, fair, and
transparent. Although that may appear straightforward,
the practical application to machine learning of each element of this principle is likely to be challenging.
*
**
***
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Directive 95/46/EC, art 15 and Recital 41. For a helpful analysis of these
provisions, see Lee Bygrave, ‘Automated Profiling, Minding the Machine:
Article 15 of the EC Data Protection Directive and Automated Profiling’,
(2001) 17(1) Computer Law & Security Review17.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art 22 and Recital 71. art 22 GDPR appears to
be broader in scope than art 15 DPD because the GDPR covers ‘a

Article 22(1) of the GDPR gives data subjects the right
not to be subject to decision-making, including profiling,
based solely on automated decision-making that produces legal effects concerning them or similarly affecting
them. Personal data used for automated decisions, including profiling, should only be collected for specified,
explicit, and legitimate purposes, and subsequent processing that is incompatible with those purposes is not
permitted. Machine learning is data driven, typically involving both existing data sets and live data streams in
complex training and deployment workflows.3 It may be
difficult to reconcile such dynamic processes with purposes that are specified narrowly in advance.
In terms of lawfulness, Article 22(2) of the GDPR
does contain some specific exemptions from the prohibition on automated decision-making, including contractual necessity and consent. In those cases, however,
Article 22(3) provides that the data controller ‘shall implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at
least the right to obtain human intervention on the part
of the controller, to express his or her point of view and
to contest the decision’. Again, this may look simple,
but in practice how can informed consent be obtained
in relation to a process that may be inherently nontransparent (a ‘black box’)? Even if an algorithmic process can in theory be explained, what if it is impossible
to do that in a way that is intelligible to a data subject?
To be sufficiently ‘specific’, will a separate consent be required for each situation in which personal data are to
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decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling’
whereas the DPD covers only ‘a decision . . . which is based solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate certain personal aspects
relating to him, such as his performance at work, creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, etc’.
Singh and others, ‘Responsibility and Machine Learning: Part of a
Process’, paper delivered at the MCCRC Symposium on Machine
Learning: Technology Law & Policy <https://queenmaryuniversit907public.sharepoint.com/Pages/Symposium-2016.aspx>
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be processed for automated decision-making, for example, in particular employment, financial, or medical
contexts? As for ‘human intervention’, it may not be
feasible for a human to conduct a meaningful review of
a process that may have involved third-party data and
algorithms (which may contain trade secrets), prelearned models, or inherently opaque machine learning
techniques.
In terms of fairness, bias may be introduced into machine learning processes at various stages, including algorithm design and selection of training data, which
may embed existing prejudices into automated
decision-making processes. For example, underrepresentation of a minority group in historic data may
reinforce discrimination against that group in future
hiring processes or credit-scoring. Profiling based on
postal codes or even magazine subscriptions may become a proxy for selection based on race or gender.4
Identifying and controlling for such biases is a critical
challenge in designing and evaluating the fairness of machine learning processes.
As regards transparency, GDPR Articles 13(2)(f) and
14(2)(g) oblige data controllers to inform data subjects
(at the time of data collection) regarding ‘the existence
of automated decision-making’ and to provide ‘meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as
the significance and the envisaged consequences of such
processing. . .’. Again, it is difficult to see how the second part of this requirement can be satisfied, especially
in cases where a machine learning process involves multiple data sources, dynamic development, and elements
that are opaque, whether for technological or proprietary reasons. Presumably, what will constitute ‘meaningful information’ about ‘logic’ must be evaluated
from the perspective of the data subject. Disclosure of
the full code of algorithms and detailed technical descriptions of machine learning processes are unlikely to
help. A high-level, non-technical, description of the
decision-making process is more likely to be meaningful. There may also be a tension between the right to generic information about a decision-making process, and
the apparently more specific right ‘to obtain an explanation of the decision reached . . . and to challenge the
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Joshua Kroll and others, ‘Accountable Algorithms’ (2017) University of
Pennsylvania Law Review (forthcoming). <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id¼2765268##>
See, for example, Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction (Allen Lane
2016).
Kroll (n) 4.
One widely reported study of judges’ behaviour at a parole board in
Israel revealed that it was much more likely for a parole application to be

decision’ (GDPR, Recital 71). Although not directly
binding, this Recital may embolden regulators and
courts to try to compel data controllers to provide explanations of specific outcomes in particular cases, and
not merely ‘meaningful information’ about ‘logic’ in
general.
So, is data protection law, and in particular the
GDPR, up to the challenge of regulating machine learning with personal data? Some commentators foresee a
bleak, indeed almost dystopian, future, in which the
growing use of algorithms increases inequality and
threatens democracy.5 Others present a more nuanced
outlook in which automated decision-making, while
not without significant risk, may be made subject to accountability and governance mechanisms that will facilitate outcomes in which anticipated benefits outweigh
potential harms. For example, technical tools might be
developed which can be applied to automated decisionmaking processes to audit and verify compliance with
data protection and other legal requirements.6
Finally, while considerable attention has been given
to the dangers of embedding unfairness in algorithmic
decision-making processes, it should not be forgotten
that human decision-making is often influenced by bias,
both conscious and unconscious, and even by metabolism.7 Indeed, while it may be extremely difficult to
ensure complete transparency in automated decisionmaking processes, even well-intentioned human decision makers are susceptible to prejudices of which even
they are unaware. This suggests the intriguing possibility
that it may in future be feasible to use an algorithmic
process to demonstrate the lawfulness, fairness, and
transparency of a decision made by either a human or a
machine to a greater extent than is possible via any human review of the decision in question. In that event,
the current data protection requirement that automated
decisions should be subject to an appeal to a human
may need to be reversed. A right to appeal to a machine
against a decision made by a human may in the end
prove to be the more effective remedy.8
doi:10.1093/idpl/ipx003
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granted in the early morning or after lunch than in the middle of the day
when the judges were hungry. ‘Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions’
(2011) 108(17) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA
6889.
See Dimitra Kamarinou and others, ‘Machine Learning with Personal
Data’, Queen Mary University of London Legal Studies Research Paper
247/2016<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id¼2865811>

